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THE TERRORIST THREAT: ARE UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES OVERSEAS SAFE?
The worst international terrorist attack in history occurred in the United States on September 11, 2001 . Nineteen hijackers belonging to the al Qaeda terrorist network, in a coordinated operation, took control of four commercial aircraft. The results are well documented. By 10:30 a.m. that day, more than 3000 people from 78 countries had been murdered. Practically every nation around the world condemned the attack and on September 20, the United States declared war on the al Qaeda. The international war on terrorism had begun.
On October 8, 2001 , President Bush established the Office of Homeland Security within the White House and directed that a comprehensive national strategy for homeland security be produced. The strategy would be based on principles of cooperation and partnership among: federal, state, and local governments and law enforcement; the military; the private sector; and the American public. 1 The nation awaits the standing up of the Department of Homeland Security, which will employ over 170,000 personnel and absorb the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the U. S. Coast Guard, the U. S. Secret Service, as well as many other federal organizations and agencies.
In the meantime, the government has made significant progress in providing protection for the general public and securing the borders in order to make the United States a safer country in which to live. However, this progress comes at a huge cost. White House characterizes "These budget allocations…as down payments to cover the most immediate security vulnerabilities." 2 These efforts and expenditure are both justifiable and appropriate to transform the country into a nation less vulnerable to future terrorist attacks during the global war on terrorism.
On February 23, 1998 , the World Islamic Front issued the following statement: "We issue the following fatwa to all Muslims: The ruling to kill the Americans and their alliescivilians and military -is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it…We -with God's help -call on every Muslim who believes in God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God's order to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it." 3 The World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and the unknown target of United Airlines flight 93 (possibly the White House or the Capitol building) are symbols of the United States, our power and what we stand for as a nation. Their destruction would be consistent with the fatwa and serve a political purpose as well.
In almost all countries around the world, the most identifiable, highest profile symbol of the United States is the American Embassy in the capital city or the American Consulate in one or more of the other cities in country. U. S. foreign policy is developed, implemented, and enunciated within 160 embassies and 78 consulates worldwide. These facilities have over 5000
American foreign service employees that serve their country. In addition, many of these facilities have repeatedly been the targets of terrorist attacks for more than twenty years.
Between 1987 and 1997, terrorists made 92 actual or attempted attacks against U. S.
embassies or consulates, the majority of which were bombings. 4 The ongoing efforts to reduce vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks within the United States must also take into account these visible foreign targets. Will American diplomatic facilities overseas now be the next targets?
What physical security programs are in place to safeguard U. S. missions and the employees working in them? Do these measures provide adequate protection? Can key vulnerabilities be significantly addressed? What must be done in the future to insure the safety of U.S.
government employees abroad? An examination of past terrorist attacks, the resulting physical security standards for diplomatic facilities, and the extent to which these have been implemented in the context of the current threat situation provide some of the answers to these vexing problems.
HOW DID ALL THIS START?
Historically, as countries developed bi-lateral relationships, they have exchanged diplomatic representatives. Recommendations for new building construction included:
• a minimum 100-foot setback from vehicular traffic,
• remote locations situated away from downtown areas,
• building sites of fifteen acres or more, and
• a minimal number of windows.
Even though DOS received the largest appropriation in its history, these "Inman standards"
were never fully funded by Congress. As the Beirut bombings faded from memory and no new attacks occurred, terrorism fell off the public screen. 2) there is a breach of security at an overseas mission involving the intelligence activities of a foreign government; or 3) a visa is issued to an individual who is included in the consular lookout system and there is thereafter probable cause to believe that the individual participated in a terrorist activity in the U.S. which resulted in serious injury, loss of life, or significant destruction of property.
The ARB should focus on whether, at the time of the incident, there were sufficient security systems in place and whether they were properly implemented. An ARB will also determine whether anyone should be held responsible for the incident. The Department of State is required to submit a report to the Congress responding to any recommendations by an ARB.
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Secretary of State Madelaine Albright convened the ARBs on October 5, 1998. Retired Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr. was named chairman for both boards, because of common links between the two bombings, including timing, suspected perpetrators, and relevant embassy security issues in question. In January 1999, the ARBs reported their findings. Although security systems and procedures for physical security met prescribed DOS standards for post rated at the medium or low threat for terrorism, the standards themselves did not adequately address the threat of large vehicular bomb attacks and were inadequate to protect against such attacks. In addition, the DOS did not apply the existing standards as fully as it should have. In many locations worldwide, standards implementation was "to the maximum extent feasible,"
applying "risk management." Neither embassy met the 100-foot setback requirement, because both were occupied before the standard was adopted, so it was waived. Waivers for setback and other problematic security standards were routine, reflecting inadequate funding to replace all sub-standard buildings. "In light of the August 7 bombings, these general exceptions to the setback requirement in particular mask a dangerous level of exposure to similar attacks elsewhere."
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The ARBs issued many key recommendations, noting that all of these key items were urgent and needed immediate action. These recommendations included:
• The DOS' physical security standards for diplomatic overseas missions should be revised to reflect a worldwide threat to every post from transnational terrorism using a wide variety of weapons, including large vehicle bombs.
• The Secretary of State should personally review embassy security, closing those facilities that are highly vulnerable and cannot be secured. Employees should be relocated to secure permanent facilities or secure temporary facilities pending construction on new buildings built to standards.
• The physical security standards themselves should be reviewed immediately and revised to adequately address the threat of large bomb attacks.
• The DOS should obtain sufficient, fenced funding (estimated at $1.4 billion per year for the next ten years) for capital building programs and other security-related operations.
"A failure to do so will jeopardize the security of US personnel abroad and inhibit America's ability to protect and promote its interests around the world." S. diplomatic facilities that are priority for replacement or for major security enhancement because of vulnerability to terrorist attack, setting these posts out in groups of twenty, from the most vulnerable to the least vulnerable. Account funds appropriated were to be dedicated to facilities in the first four groups. SAM's vulnerability list now needed an injection of operational reality.
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DOS regional bureaus and functional offices, as well as other stakeholders and interested parties such as the U. S. Information Agency, the U. S. Agency for International Development, and the Foreign Commercial Service, were given an opportunity to voice their concerns. Issues such as project executability or do-ability, site availability, and local political conditions also needed to be considered before priorities could be made. The first congressional report for FY2000 which resulted from this process was produced in February.
By that time, new embassy projects for Nairobi and Dar es Salaam had already been funded.
The priority list, in bands of twenty, reflected DSS' vulnerability ratings, with some adjustments made by senior DOS management. Eight facilities were funded for FY2000, two for FY2001
and eight for FY2002. Almost fifty additional New Office Building projects are at the design or site acquisition phase.
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The DSS revised physical security standards applicable for U.S. diplomatic facilities overseas. The new standards were effective as of December 17, 1999 and changes to minimum requirements for chanceries and consulates included the following:
• Perimeter walls and fences will be constructed to provide anti-ram protection to all areas that are accessible to vehicle approaches to prevent or limit vehicle penetration, • Traffic lanes will be between ten and twelve feet in width, with a gate and active anti-ram • Existing office buildings (defined by 12 FAH-5 H-112, p. 35 as "DOS-designed office buildings or compounds which were at 35% design development stage prior to July 1991 or office buildings or compounds not designed by DOS which were acquired through purchase, lease, or other means prior to July 1991") will provide a minimum standoff distance of 100 feet to the maximum extent feasible.
• A clear zone extending 20 feet from the perimeter wall on new office building and newly acquired building compounds, free of auxiliary buildings, parking or man-made obstructions will be provided. Existing office buildings will comply to the maximum extent feasible, • Employee parking at new office buildings will be located at least 20 feet from the building; at newly acquired buildings 50 feet; and at existing buildings to the maximum extent feasible. There will be no unauthorized visitor parking inside the compound.
Other changes to standards relating to building and window construction, uniform application of shatter resistant window film, ballistic resistance and forced entry protection, blast mitigation, and interior safe havens were also incorporated. They have been responsible for identifying surveillance, terrorist and criminal, which has resulted in detentions, arrests, and in some cases deportations. Several of the more celebrated "foiled" terrorist plots which have appeared in the news over the past few years were the result of the initial efforts of an SDT.
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It is important to note that surveillance detection is the act of determining whether surveillance is being conducted against a particular target. It is a defensive security measure that can be conducted by an individual or a specifically designed operation by a trained team. It is not counter-surveillance, which is a security and intelligence operation designed to determine the existence of hostile surveillance activity prior to operational activity, and attempt to counteract or disrupt the pre-operational surveillance. Counter-surveillance is not an authorized activity for these DSS surveillance detection teams or individuals. The program operates with the knowledge and consent of the host government as a defensive security operation only. Visitor screening and access control procedures were enhanced. All visitors to the mission now need to be issued a temporary identification badge on arrival and escorted while in the building. Visa applicants generally need pre-scheduled appointments; walk in applications are a thing of the past. All visitors must pass through a walk through metal detector, have their carry articles physically searched and x-rayed, and check any electronic items, including cell phones and palm pilots, before proceeding past the inspection area. The newly-deployed/-upgraded X-ray equipment is state-of-the-art, with "back-scatter" capability to detect plastic explosives themselves, as well as the usual batteries, wires, detonators, timers and other circuitry commonly used in the construction of improvised explosive devices. External and internal closed circuit television cameras allow local guards and Marine Security Guards to monitor and record all of the activity that the cameras see. Many missions have access card control systems, which limit employee and visitor access throughout the entire building and activate alarms when unauthorized access is attempted or gained.
Additional and improved alarm and public address systems at virtually all embassies and consulates have been installed to alert employees to impending emergency situations. Older emergency notification systems had four alert tones for emergencies such as fire, bomb and terrorist or intruder, in response to which employees took different actions. The new "duck and cover" systems have two alternatives: take immediate cover and stay there until told otherwise, or evacuate the building. The duck and cover system can be activated by the Marine Security Guard, the Regional Security Officer, the local guard in the compound or vehicle inspection area, or remotely by the SDT, should it identify an immediate threat. This improvement was yet another lesson learned from Nairobi, when employees went to windows to see what the small explosion was that preceded the truck bomb detonation.
The most important security improvement implemented by DSS since the 1998 embassy bombings was the continued pressure on DOS management for authorization and funding to hire more Special Agents, Security Engineering Officers, and Security Technicians to run and administer the new overseas programs and policies DSS was creating. As of January 1, 2003, DSS has 1225 special agents (including 263 new hires and 92 special agents in training) on duty, 527 of whom are assigned as regional security officers at 195 posts in 156 counties. This is in stark contrast to the total force of 639 special agents on the job in August 1998, 269 of whom were assigned overseas. The FY 2004 Diplomatic and Consular Programs request also provides $646.7 million for Worldwide Security Upgrades-an increase of $93.7 million over last year. This total includes $504.6 million to continue worldwide security programs for guard protection, physical security equipment and technical support, information and system security, and security personnel and training. It also includes $43.4 million to expand the perimeter security enhancement program for 232 posts and $98.7 million for improvements in domestic and overseas protection programs, including 85 additional agents and other security professionals.
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SO…IS IT SAFE?
Unfortunately, no. 
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The Government of Kuwait cooperated in a regional effort to uncover and disrupt an international terrorist cell, arresting more than a dozen people and recovering a large cache of weapons and explosives. The cell was planning to attack Kuwaiti officials and U.S. targets in Kuwait and in the region. In response to terrorist threats, Jordanian security forces augmented support at the U.S embassy facilities in Amman in June, successfully averting any violence.
Several threats against U.S. military and civilian personnel and facilities in Saudi Arabia were reported during the year, but there were no confirmed terrorist incidents. Usama bin Laden continued to publicly threaten U.S. interests in Saudi Arabia, including a video tape released in September. 29 Even though no successful terrorist attacks were conducted against U.S. Procurement had begun for twenty-one tons of explosives, most of which was on hand. As a result of the arrests in Singapore, the Government of the Philippines discovered and thwarted another related terrorist plot in that country, seizing more than a ton of TNT and explosive initiators. Turning first to the current and near-term threats, Bin Laden's Al Qaeda network will almost certainly attempt further major terrorist operations against American targets abroad and, potentially, here. We know that the September 11 th attack was years in planning, which means that preparations for it overlapped the attacks on the American embassies in Africa and the U.S.S. Cole, as well as the foiled attempt to carry out terrorist attacks here during the millennium celebrations. The terrorist leaders also would know that the September 11 th attack would provoke a military response, which they could then characterize as an assault on Islam. In other words, the terrorist leaders did not intend September 11 th to be their last act-they intended it as the beginning of their endgame. Therefore, they would have made plans to survive the anticipated military response and continue to communicate, and they may have set in motion terrorist operations that will occur weeks or months or years from now, unless we can identify and destroy every terrorist cell...In terms of targets abroad, diplomatic facilities and corporate symbols of America will bear the brunt of terrorist attacks. Nearly three years before DCI Tenet's testimony, Admiral Crowe made the following statements in the introduction to the ARB report:
Successful overseas terrorist attacks kill our people, diminish confidence in our power, and bring tragedy to our friends in host countries. When choosing embassy sites, safety and security concerns should guide our considerations more than whether a location may be convenient or of historic, symbolic importance. Most host countries want US embassies to be safe. If they don't, then we probably shouldn't be there. There is every likelihood that there will be further large bomb and other kinds of attacks. We must face this fact and do more to provide security or we will continue to see our people killed, our embassies blown away, and the reputation of the United States overseas eroded.
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Yet in a later interview, Crowe, the former U.S. ambassador to the United Kingdom, expressed dismay that the London embassy might someday have to move from its prominent, prestigious Grosvenor Square location. And Philip C. Wilcox, former coordinator for counterterrorism at DOS and a member of Crowe's ARB, was quoted as saying, "Some buildings of great historic value are treasures to be preserved. We can afford to make exceptions to the Inman standards where environmental factors combine to minimize risk and host governments and their law enforcement and intelligence services have a proven record against terrorism." 43 The reality is when political will is strong, any and all security standards, regulations, and considerations can be overlooked or disregarded. History has shown that significant loss of life can only temporarily change the priorities.
AND THE ANSWER IS…?
Physical and procedural security as currently implemented at U.S. overseas missions worldwide by the DOS is a deterrent at best. 
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Prior knowledge concerning targeting activities, ongoing surveillance, or an impending terrorist attack against a U.S. diplomatic mission permits host government security and police authorities to intercede and eliminate the threat. Absent closing down facilities worldwide to eliminate terrorist threats to U.S. employees, and the embassies and consulates in which they work, deterrence is the only answer to the question of safety and security. It is practically impossible to permanently eliminate a trans-national organization actively engaged in terrorist operations. But disrupting the organization's plans and activities, hopefully on a consistent basis, is possible, as long as the right intelligence is available, shared and acted upon.
Intelligence is the key.
Terrorist groups such as al Qaeda and Hizballah have been successful employing a wide range of communications, from one-on-one personal conversations to encrypted email messages. The group's unpredictability, coupled with a relatively flat organization composed of small cells in over sixty countries, limit the effectiveness of traditional technical collection methods. 46 The ease with which people, resources and information move across international borders has provided opportunities for recruitment and fundraising. Terrorist cells often contain members of more than one nationality. The movements of these loosely affiliated transnational terrorist networks are almost impossible to track. Because these extremists are highly motivated, ideologically committed, and operationally compartmented, infiltration of their organization, especially by Western agents, is extremely difficult. Understanding the frame of reference of the soldier, the lens through which he sees his world, and how he identifies success are essential for accurate analysis. Human intelligence is key to understanding real and potential motivation, resolve, decision-making, capabilities, modus operandi, and culture.
This intelligence will produce insights and facilitate decisions as to how best to disrupt a suspect group's plans. The Law Enforcement community is neither fully exploiting the growing amount of information it collects during the course of terrorism investigations nor distributing that information effectively to analysts and policymakers. Although the FBI does promptly share warning information about specific terrorist threats with the CIA and other agencies, it is less likely to disseminate terrorist information that may not relate to an immediate threat even though this could be of immense longterm or cumulative value to the Intelligence Community.
As long as a lack of coordination, whether interagency or international, leaves gaps in counter-terrorism efforts, terrorist organizations will be undeterred, believing they can exploit these gaps to successfully attack. Divisions. The ILEC will also support the publication of the DSS Daily Security Brief.
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CONCLUSION
As the United States continues to strengthen the defensive posture of the homeland, terrorist organizations are going to look for softer, but still high profile, targets. American embassies and consulates around the world are likely to be at the top of the list. Significant efforts have been, and continue to be, made to identify vulnerabilities. Physical security is the most problematic and most expensive of these. However, the United States does not have the unlimited resources required to protect against every conceivable threat worldwide. Therefore, diplomatic facilities requiring physical security upgrades were prioritized, based on risk assessments and a variety of other factors, including political considerations. These selected, new embassy and upgrade projects continue to be funded and completed. Other physical, procedural and information security answers to other identified vulnerabilities at all diplomatic missions have been implemented. American diplomatic facilities are now much safer places for the U.S. government employees who work in them. Unfortunately, all of these security precautions are merely deterrents to terrorists. And once a terrorist is prepared to die, there is no deterrence. So intelligence regarding terrorist planning and operations, properly disseminated and analyzed, is the only way to avert terrorist attacks and effectively protect U.S.
employees and facilities abroad.
WORD COUNT=8,034
